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NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-MENTAL .ANGUISH FROM WITNESSING PERIL OF 
THIRD PARTY-Plaintiffs (husband, wife, and three children) incurred 
physical injuries and a fourth child was burned to death in an automobile 
collision with the defendant's vehicle. Plaintiffs claimed compensation 
for mental anguish sustained from witnessing the death of the child. 
Defendant's motion to strike the allegations of mental suffering, held, 
granted. Defendant owes no legal duty to protect plaintiffs from mental 
suffering caused by viewing another in peril. Lessard v. Tarca, (Conn. 
Super. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 625. 
It is generally agreed that, with the exceptions of mistreatment of a 
corpse1 and delay in transmission of death messages by telegram,2 there 
can be no recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress unless it is 
14 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §868 (1939). See also 41 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1942). 
2So Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881). See collection of 
cases in 7 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 772 (1930). 
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accompanied by a physical injury.3 If it is sustained contemporaneously 
with a physical injury, however, all courts allow compensation for men-
tal suffering as an ordinary and proximate consequence of a recognized 
cause of action.4 The issue producing difficulty for the courts arises when 
fright causes physical injury. In this context the physical harm caused by 
emotional disturbance is necessary to create a legally recognized interest. 
Here the courts are split on the requirements for recovery. Some espouse 
the "impact" doctrine which denies compensation unless the plaintiff 
proves a contemporaneous physical impact, however trivial.5 The physical 
invasion merely establishes the cause of action and is irrelevant to the 
amount of damages sustained.6 Other courts adopt the non-impact theory 
which regards the fright as only a link in the chain of causation between 
the defendant's wrongful act and the consequent physical injury.7 All 
courts, however, deny recovery if the plaintiff's physical injury proceeds 
from fear, not of personal harm to himself, but to the person of another, 
unless the plaintiff is within the zone of foreseeable physical injury. Other-
wise, liability for negligence becomes limitless, according to the leading 
case of Waube v. Warrington.8 Thus, some courts have held that plaintiff 
may recover for the effects of fright due to fear for her child where plaintiff 
s Wyman v. •Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880). See cases in 23 A.L.R. 361, 365 (1923), supple-
mented in 44 A.L.R. 428, 429 (1926); 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928). 
4 1 TORTS R.EsrATEMENT §47(2) (1934; Supp. 1948). Connecticut has followed this rule 
since Seger v. Town of ·Bakkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290 (1853). 
5 "The point decided in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 168 Mass. 285 and White 
v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296 is not put as a logical deduction from the general principles of 
liability in tort, ,but as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds." 
Holmes, C. J., in Smith v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576 at 577-578, 55 
N.E. 380 (1899). . 
6 "Recovery has been allowed where there has been physical impact, but it has 
been frankly said that where there has been impact the damages recoverable are not 
limited to those resulting therefrom. The magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the 
door opens to the full joy of a complete recovery." Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance 
as Legal Damage," 20 MrcH. L. REv. 497 at 504 (1922). This article contains an excellent 
discussion of the physical effects of fright. 
7 Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. (2d) 402 (1941). See Throckmorton, 
"Damages for Fright,'' 34 HARV. L. REv. 260 (1921), for collection of cases from impact 
and non-impact states. See also 11 A.L.R. 1119, 1128, 1134 (1921), supplemented in 40 
A.L.R. 983, 984, 985 (1926); 76 A.L.R. 681, 682, 684 (1932); 98 AJL.R. 402, 403 (1935). 
8 216 Wis. 603 at 613, 258 N.W. 497 (1935): "The answer must be reached by balanc-
ing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plain-
tiff's right may justly and expediently be extended. It is our conclusion that they can 
neither justly nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical injuries sustained 
by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing 
another's danger." Some writers have suggested an exception to this rule where a parent's 
fright and consequent physical injury result from perceiving danger to the child although 
the parent is outside the area of expectible physical danger. See PROSSER, TORTS 181-182 
(1955); HARv. L. RECORD, Feb. 21, 1957, p. 2:2-4; Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARv. 
L. REv. 725 (1937). The Restatement of Torts e.xpressed no opinion where a spouse or 
parent suffers shock and consequent bodily harm from witnessing the peril or harm to 
the spouse or child, though recovery would be denied to all other persons, 2 TORTS 
R.EsrATEMENT §313, caveat (1934). 
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was warding off a chimpanzee attacking the child;9 where plaintiff was on 
first floor and a truck crashed into the basement where the children were 
playing;10 and where plaintiff was in the house and a runaway truck 
endangered a child on the porch.11 The principal case lends itself to this 
analysis since the plaintiffs were riding in the car which was struck by 
the defendant and, therefore, were distinctly within the zone of foreseeable 
danger. Moreover, they received physical injuries from the same act of the 
defendant which caused the death of the child. The court, however, did 
not accept this analysis and relied instead upon a recent Connecticut 
decision12 in which the plaintiff was not in peril of physical injury so 
that there was no breach of duty to her. However, the principal case is 
distinguishable on the facts in that plaintiffs sustained physical injuries 
from the same negligent act which caused the child's death. Few decisions 
have involved this situation. The courts are not unanimous, but those 
denying recovery rely upon decisions in which the plaintiff was not in 
personal peril.13 It is submitted that the Connecticut court failed to con-
sider the distinction between proximate cause and duty. If the defendant's 
negligence resulted in physical injury to the deceased only, fright and 
physical disturbance suffered by an onlooking plaintiff outside the area 
of expectible physical danger would not be legally compensable, for there 
would be no duty owing to him.14 However, in the principal case there 
was a violation of a legaUy protected interest in that each plaintiff 
sustained physical injuries from the defendant's conduct. The mental 
suffering, although the result of witnessing the peril of another person, 
merely became one element of the damages. The right of each plaintiff 
was independent and was not based on injury to another person. As 
already shown,15 emotional distress is compensable when associated with 
a recognized cause of action. Adopting the view of the principal case 
create~ a paradoxical situation, for while this court denies compensation 
to a mother for mental anguish caused by witnessing the death of her 
child, other courts have allowed it· to a physically injured, pregnant 
plaintiff for anguish caused by fears that harm may result to her unborn 
child.16 The principal case illustrates that courts should re-examine the 
9 Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918). 
10 Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). 
11 Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 ,P. (2d) 1037 (1935). 
12 Fedukowski v. Fedukowski, 18 Conn. Sup. 248 (1953). 
13 Alston v. Cooley, 5 La. App. 623 (1927); Shenvood v. Ticheli, 10 La. App. 280, 
120 S. 107 (1929). Taylor v. Spokane, Portland 8: Seattle Railway Co., 72 Wash. 378, 130 
P. 506 (1913), and Clough v. Steen, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 392, 39 P. (2d) 889 (1934), are some-
times cited but the language of the courts in both is ambiguous. Contra, Humphrey v. 
Twin State Gas and Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 A. 440 (1927). Austin v. Mascarin, Ont. 
R. 165, 2 D.L.R. 316 (1942) allows recovery although the reason is unclear. 
14 Waube v. Warrington, note 8 supra. 
15 See note 3 supra. 
16 Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457, 135 P. (2d) 283 (1943); Rosen v. Yellow Cab Co., 
162 Pa. Super. 58, 56 A. (2d) 398 (1948). Contra, Nevala v. Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 
N.W. 93 (1925). See collection of cases in 145 A.L.R. 1092, 1109 (1943). 
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entire problem, shorn of legalisms, to remove the artificialities and incon-
sistencies. The courts have started in this direction and probably will so 
continue.17 It is therefore unfortunate that the principal case, instead 
of clarifying issues, constitutes an addition to a legal labyrinth. 
Mark Shaevsky 
17 I STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906): "The treatment of 
any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of 
legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow 
be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social, 
economic, and ind_ustrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law." 
